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CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS
PROHIBITING "DECEPTIVE
PRACTICES" AND "FALSE
ADVERTISING": PROPER
VEHICLES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY*
Hugh C. Hansen**
What role should §§ 349 and 350 of the New York General Busi-
ness Law play in the protection of intellectual property? They were
enacted to protect consumers against "deceptive practices" and
"false advertising." Are these provisions, nevertheless, appropriate
vehicles for businesses to fight passing-off by competitors, and
trademark and trade dress infringement? The answer is important
because both provisions allow the court to award attorney fees to
prevailing plaintiffs.
The McKinney's Practice Commentary to §§ 349 and 350 argues
that they should not be applicable to intellectual property claims.
Without much discussion, two cases have followed this view while
others have assumed, to the contrary, that they are applicable. This
article takes the position that normal statutory construction, the leg-
islative histories, and the policies behind §§ 349 and 350 all support
the proposition that they are properly applicable to intellectual
property claims.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Article 22-A of the General Business Law (then §§ 350 - 350- d)
was enacted in 1963. These provisions were aimed at combatting
false advertising and were based upon a study and report prepared
by the New York State Bar Association's Special Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws of New York. After some modification of the com-
mittee's proposal, New York's Attorney General sponsored a bill
"designed to provide the needed authority to cope with the numer-
ous, ever-changing types of false and deceptive business practices
which plague consumers in our State."1 Patterned after the Federal
* Copyright @ 1991 by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. Reprinted with
permission from NEW YORK INTELLE CTUAL PROPERTY HAMwoox by Hugh C.
Hansen. All rights reserved.
** The author has been a member of the faculty of the Fordham University
School of Law School since 1978. Professor Hansen teaches constitutional, copy-
right and trademark law.
1. Attorney General, Memorandum for the Governor re Senate Int. 1581, Pr.
1604, 1 (January 8, 1963).
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Trade Commission model (15 U.S.C. § 41, et seq.), it looked to gov-
ernment enforcement of a prohibition against "false advertising in
the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing
of any service in this state." Gen. Bus. L. §§ 350, 350-d (formerly
§ 350-c). As with the FTC Act, the original version of Article 22-A
did not permit private actions. Moreover, the Attorney General was
required to notify persons against whom he contemplated taking ac-
tion that they had an opportunity to "show either orally or in writing
why such action should not be commenced." Gen. Bus. L. § 350-c
(formerly 350-b).
Despite the provision in section 350-c which allows potential de-
fendants to avoid prosecution by showing the Attorney General that
their actions comply with FTC or New York State agency require-
ments, opponents of the legislation argued that it would subject
businesses to overlapping and, perhaps, conflicting, interpretations
of the New York and federal provisions. 2 Governor Rockefeller re-jected this argument and concluded that the statute would "promote
uniform application of State and Federal Law," and that it repre-
sented "significant progress towards eradicating deceptive prac-
tices of unprincipled businessmen."'
Article 22-A was expanded in 1970 to include Gen. Bus. L. § 349
which barred any "deceptive acts or practices" by any business in
New York. Gen. Bus. L. § 349(a). As was the case in the earlier
legislation, this additional provision was based upon the FTC model.
However, it was more limited than the federal version in that a pro-
hibition against "unfair practices" was omitted. Once again, re-
sponsibility for enforcement was left to the Attorney General and
included the authority to bring actions for restitution for those par-
ties who were defrauded by the deceptive practices. Gen. Bus. L.
§ 349(b). The additional provision was thought to afford the state a
"practical means of halting consumer frauds at their incipiency
without the necessity to wait for development of persistent frauds."4
Because of the broad, open-ended standards of Gen. Bus. L.
2. Letter from Arnold Witte, General Manager, Commerce and Industry Ass'n
of New York to Sol N. Corbin, Counsel to the Governor (Rockefeller) (April 10,
1963). Another business group objected because, in its view, businesses would
have to sustain the burden of proof with respect to alleged violations. Letter of
John J. Roberts, Executive Vice President, Empire State Chamber of Commerce to
Sol N. Corbin, Counsel to the Governor (April 17, 1963). There is, however, noth-
ing in the statute to indicate such a burden, although Gen. Bus. L. § 350-c (now
§ 350-d) did set up an affirmative defense of compliance with FTC or state agency
regulations.
3. Governor's Memorandum on S.I. 1581, Pr. 1604, Anderson Ch. 813, New
York Legislative Annual (1963) 465, 466.
4. Governor's Memorandum on S. 953-B and A. 1101, New York Legislative
Annual 1970, p. 472-73 (this memorandum also concerned Executive Law
§ 63(12)).
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§§ 349 and 350, it was initially thought fitting to leave enforcement
solely in the hands of the Attorney General who would be relied
upon to exercise appropriate discretion in bringing actions. How-
ever, due to the meager enforcement resources at the Attorney Gen-
eral's disposal, it soon became apparent that such limited efforts
would never be adequate. s Moreover, by 1980, 42 other states and
the District of Columbia had supplemented public enforcement of
their "deceptive acts and practices" statutes with a private right of
action. A New York proposal to add such a right to both Gen. Bus.
L. §§ 349 and 350 was opposed by business interests. They argued
that, since New York-unlike other states-had never defined "de-
ceptive acts or practices," this open-ended standard would lead to
"the abuse of legitimate businesses by irresponsible parties.' 6 How-
ever, heeding the advice of the Attorney General, consumer organi-
zations and most bar groups, Governor Carey signed the
amendments in 1980, stating that they would "encourage private
enforcement of these consumer protection statutes, add a strong de-
terrent against deceptive business practices and supplement the ac-
tivities of the Attorney General in the prosecution of consumer fraud
5. See Memorandum of the New York Attorney General for the Governor on A
7223B, 2 (May 21, 1980) ("[The Attorney General's] resources are limited, and
every complaint of consumer fraud cannot be investigated and litigated. The office
must concentrate its efforts [on] those deceptive practices cases which affect signifi-
cant numbers of consumers"); Letter from the Mayor of City of New York to Gover-
nor Hugh L. Carey (May 20, 1980) ("Existing State law makes it virtually
impossible for the Attorney General, given the limited resources of that office, to
provide more than minimal enforcement").
6. Letter of Raymond T. Schuler, President, Associated Industries of New York
State, to Richard A. Brown, Counsel to the Governor, 1 (June 11, 1980). See also
Letter of William D. Hassett, Jr., Commissioner, Department of Commerce, to Rich-
ard A. Brown (June 13, 1980) ("legislation unnecessary and in derogation of the
economy of the State"); Letter of Patrick J. Mulhern, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel, Citibank, to Richard Brown, 2 (June 20, 1980) (bill is "too open-
ended and devoid of any procedural safeguards against abuse"). The Attorney
General countered that there is a well-established body of federal and state law as
to what is deceptive and that experience with other federal and state consumer
statutes including some specific consumer frauds law in New York, demonstrated
that "fears of a plethora of litigation are unfounded." See Memorandum of Attorney
General, n.5 supra at 2, 3. Another business concern was the possibility of class
actions being allowed especially when coupled with the $50.00 minimum damage
award. Schuler letter, supra at 2.
The Business Law Committee of the New York State Bar Association objected to
the private right of action in Gen. Bus. L. § 350 because it did not duplicate the
defense available to an action by the Attorney General that the "advertisement is
subject to and complies with the rules and regulations of, and the Statutes adminis-
tered by the Federal Trade Commission [or state agency]." See Letter of Walter V.
Ferris, New York State Bar Ass'n, to Richard A. Brown, Counsel to the Governor
(June 5, 1980).
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complaints."7
In 1984, Gen. Bus. L. § 349(h) and 350-d were amended further
to make it clear that a private action could be brought for either
injunctive relief or damages, or both. This amendment was made in
response to a New York City Civil Court decision which had deter-
mined that section 349(h) required that a plaintiff injured by decep-
tive trade practices must sue for both damages and injunctive relief,
and not simply one or the other.8 The Civil Court's construction pre-
vented plaintiffs from seeking inexpensive and simple redress in
small claims court which cannot grant injunctive relief. The 1984
amendments make it clear that plaintiffs can choose small claims
court over supreme court if they are willing to forego injunctive
relief.9
The most recent amendments to Gen. Bus. L. Article 22-A were
enacted in 1988, 1989 and 1991. In 1988, Gen. Bus. L. § 350-a
was amended to deal specifically with false advertising in employ-
ment situations.' 0 In 1989, a new section 350-b was added dealing
with disclosures required when the title "doctor" is used in an ad-
vertisement. 1I In 1991, this provision was amended to specify more
precisely when the use of the title "doctor" is permissible. 1 2
APPLICATION OF GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §§ 349 AND
350 TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS
An account of the broad scope of coverage Gen. Bus. L. Article
22-A provides with regard to traditional unfair trade and consumer
fraud issues involving false advertising or deceptive practices is be-
yond the scope of this Comment. The concern in this Comment is
7. Memorandum of the Governor on Approving L. 1980, Chs. 345 and 346(June 19, 1980), 1980 Legislative Annual 1867.
8. Beslity v. Manhattan Honda, 113 Misc. 2d 888, 450 N.Y.S.2d 278 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. 1982), rev'd, 120 Misc. 2d 848, 467 N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. T. 1st Dept.
1983).
9. Subd. 3, L. 1984, Ch. 157, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1984. Ironically, the legislation
was not necessary to correct the Civil Court interpretation as the Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, had reversed in Beslity v. Manhattan Honda, 120 Misc. 2d
848, 467 N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. T. 1st Dept. 1983). It noted that the legislative intent
had been to provide for cumulative or alternative remedies. When the statute au-
thorized a private action to enjoin "and" recover damages, the court held that it
could "substitute 'or' for 'and' in a statute where it is necessary to carry out legisla-
tive intent." Id. 120 Misc. 2d at 853, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
The legislature also amended the relevant small claims statutes to allow repre-
sentation of corporations by authorized officers, directors or employees instead of
legal counsel to defend actions brought under Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350.
10. L. 1988, Ch. 615, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1988.
11. L. 1989, Ch. 65, § 1, eff. July 20, 1989. In addition, the later sections were
renumbered and the word "evidence" was added to the renumbered Gen. Bus. L.
§ 350-c. Id. at §§ 1, 2.
12. L. 1991, Ch. 165, § 1, efl. May 31, 1991.
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with the extent to which sections 349 and 350 can be used in an
intellectual property case and, more specifically, in a trademark or
trade dress context, to redress deception as to the source of the
goods. The answer lies in the resolution of two issues: (1) whether
non-consumer businesses, usually competitors, have standing to sue
as "injured persons;" and (2) whether "false advertising" and "de-
ceptive practices" will be construed to include passing off, and
trademark and trade dress infringement. Issue one, the more gen-
eral issue of the standing of non-consumer businesses, presents the
same questions for resolution in actions tied to deception as to the
source of goods as it does in the more traditional unfair trade and
consumer fraud actions. Issue two is narrower and concerns the
scope of protection provided under sections 349 and 350.
Standing
Both the Attorney General and "injured persons" have standing
to bring actions under Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350. However, due
to scarce resources and lack of expertise, the Attorney General's
Office is unlikely to use either section to bring passing-off, or trade-
mark or trade dress infringement actions. Individual consumers in-
jured by such practices are also unlikely to have the expertise to
recognize the nature of such violations or the resources to bring ac-
tions under Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350. On the other hand, it is
possible that an intellectual property attorney could identify and or-
ganize a group of injured consumers and bring a class action on
their behalf under these provisions. Consumer class actions, how-
ever, do not adequately represent the interests of businesses which
may be sorely injured by deceptions practiced by competitors as to
the source of goods.
It is unclear under the language of Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350
whether a business injured by passing off and infringement activity
is an "injured person" within the meaning of these provisions. In
determining whether businesses have standing as "injured persons,"
it is important to keep in mind that while Article 22-A is entitled
"Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices," the in-
tent of the substantive provisions was to "protect both consumers
and honest businessmen from the many varied forms of decep-
tion.""3 Thus, when the legislature authorized private actions under
13. Report of the Committee on New York State Antitrust Law of the Antitrust
Law Section of the New York State Bar Association 6 (Dec. 31, 1967) (emphasis
added). Both Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350 were the result of reports by the N.Y.S.B.
Ass'n Antitrust Law Section. This report led to the enactment of Gen. Bus. L. § 349
and has been treated as being authoritative as to the intent of the section. See
Matter of the State of New York v. Colorado State Christian College of the Church
of the Inner Power, Inc., 76 Misc. 2d 50, 53, 346 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. 1973) (Asch, J.).
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the provisions, it would have made no sense for it to allow one
group it intended to protect (consumers) to bring actions, while de-
nying the other protected group (honest businessmen) the same
right of action.
Furthermore, while it is not disputed that the 1980 private action
amendments to Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349(h) and 350-d (now § 350-e) pri-
marily focused upon suits by consumers,1 4 the legislative intent was
to allow businesses to bring actions as well. This additional intent is
illustrated by the language of the provisions and their legislative
history.
First, traditional statutory construction considers businesses to be
legal persons, and there is no question that a business can be injured
by competitors' false advertising and deceptive business practices.
Second, there are numerous statements in the legislative history in-
dicating that the statute was intended to permit businesses to sue in
their own right and there is no record of anyone opposing this inter-
pretation. For instance, the Attorney General stated that "a business
itself will be able to use the private right of action against another
business engaged in deceptive practices and thereby obtain in-
creased legal protection."' s In addition, the senator who drafted
the private action amendment stated that "(t]his bill gives consumers
and businessmen the right to bring suit where they have been in-
jured... and will allow business to regulate itself.' 16 The New York
State Council of Retail Merchants, Inc., noted that the provision
"protects both the consumer and legitimate businesses by providing
competitor policing of false advertising."' 17 Likewise, the New York
State Consumer Protection Board found that the bill "affords a legal
remedy to consumers and business persons injured by the deceptive
act of false advertising."'"
Finally, businesses, because of their greater resources and access
to counsel, and their greater injury and damages, are the most likely
private parties to accomplish the policy goals of the 1980 private
action amendments, namely, "to encourage private enforcement of
these consumer protection statutes, add a strong deterrent against
14. See "Bill to give consumers new clout," Albany Times-Union, June 1, 1980,
at F-7.
15. See Memorandum of the Attorney General for the Governor, n.5 supra at 3.
16. Memorandum of Senator James J. Lack on S. 7132-B, Ch. 345, New York
Legislative Annual - 1980, 146.
17. The New York State Council of Retail Merchants, Inc. Memorandum of Jan-
uary 11, 1980, p. 2 (written when only private action for Gen. Bus. L. § 350 had
been introduced).
18. Memorandum of Rosemary S. Pooler, Chairwoman and Executive Director
of the New York State Consumer Protection Board to the Senate Consumer Protec-
tion Committee, 1 (January 15, 1980) (at this time there was only proposed an
amendment to Gen. Bus. L. § 350-d; this memorandum suggested a similar amend-
ment to Gen. Bus. L. § 349).
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deceptive business practices and supplement the activities of the At-
torney General."19
It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have generally allowed
suits by businesses. 20 Richard Givens, in his McKinney's Practice
Commentary on Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350, argues that the provi-
sions only permit businesses to sue when they function as consum-
ers.2 1 This argument is without merit. One court specifically
addressed the issues raised by Givens' Practice Commentary and
concluded that non-consumer businesses do have standing under
both sections 349 and 350.22 Moreover, Givens improperly cites a
New York Supreme Court case, Sulner v. General Acc. Fire and Life
Assur. Corp.,23 to support the proposition that businesses can sue as
consumers only where the transaction is potentially recurring and
affects the public. While the SuLner court did hold that a business
consumer can sue under Gen. Bus. L. § 349, it did not view the
transaction upon which the plaintiff's claim was based as affecting
the public generally or as potentially recurring. In fact, the Sulner
court did not address the issue of whether a non-consumer business
could sue.
19. See Memorandum of the Governor on approving L. 1980, Chs. 345 and
346, dated June 19, 1980.
20. See Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("Competitors, as well as consumers are given the right to sue under [Gen.
Bus. L. § 350-d]"); Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc.,
652 F. Supp. 1105, 1112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (defendant publisher of similar maga-
zine to same class of consumers; plaintiff contemplated an American edition that
would directly compete with defendant's magazine); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendant distributor of com-
peting jeans), aff'd 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986); Vitabiotics, Ltd. v. Krupka, 606 F.
Supp. 779, 782 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendant seller of competing vitamins).
21. See Givens, Practice Commentary to N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 (McKinney's
1988) Book 19 at 569, 1991 Supp. at 75, 81 (hereinafter "Givens Practice
Commentary").
22. See Construction Technology, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 704 F. Supp. 1212,
1222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Mukasey, J.).
23. See Sulner v. General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 122 Misc. 2d 597,
471 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1984) (Baer, I.) (plaintiff relied upon defend-
ant insurer's claims adjuster representation that damaged documents were covered
and that it was no longer necessary to retain the damaged items; after plaintiff dis-
posed of items, it was advised that defendant disclaimed coverage; though nothing
in the facts indicated that transaction was capable of recurring nor that it affected
the public generally, court held that the adjuster's statements were deceptive acts
within the scope of Gen. Bus. L. § 349, noting the rule that "remedial statutes are
liberally construed [in order] to carry out the reforms intended"). Id. 122 Misc. 2d
at 600, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 797. The Sulner court's construction was much broader
than that of Judge Weinfeld in a similar situation. See Genesco Entertainment v.
Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 750-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussed at Ns. 34-38 and ac-
companying text infra).
1991]
38 Entertainment, Media & Intellectual Property Law Forum [Vol. 2
Scope of Protection
As noted above, the second issue for determination is the extent to
which Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350 can be used in an intellectual
property context to redress deception as to the source of goods. In
other words, the issue is whether "false advertising" and "deceptive
practices"-provisions which were aimed at traditional consumer
fraud-should be construed to include passing off, and trademark
and trade dress infringement. In construing the words of these sec-
tions, it takes no stretch of the imagination to conclude that deceiv-
ing consumers as to the source of the goods that they are buying is a
"deceptive practice." Likewise, it is not difficult to determine that
advertisements which deceive consumers as to the source of goods
are false. This construction is consistent with Governor Rockefel-
ler's statement that Gen. Bus. L. § 350 "adds an important new assur-
ance to the people of this State that the goods and services they
purchase are as represented."2 4 Application of sections 349 and
350 to trademark and trade dress infringement actions is further
supported by the fact that proof of deceptive intent is not required
by these provisions to establish a violation of either section.25 This
is compatible with the rule for establishing trademark and trade
dress infringements, which similarly does not require a showing of
deceptive intent.26
In his McKinney's Practice Commentary, Richard Givens objects
to applying Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350 to redress deceptions of
the public as to the source of goods.27 One of Givens' objections is
that such an application "would bring the 'one-way' prevailing
plaintiff attorney's fee provisions of § 349(h) and § 350-d to bear in
a context totally different from that originally contemplated.""8 In
fact, however, the original context-false advertising, deceptive
acts and practices-is not substantially different from deception as
to the source of goods (i.e., passing off, trademark and trade dress
infringement) context. In both situations, consumers are deceived
with regard to the products or services that they are buying. Fur-
thermore, both types of deception result in harm to "consumers and
24. Governor's Memorandum, n.3 supra at 466.
25. See, e.g., Genesco Entertainment v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 752 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) ("Because the purpose of the statute is 'not to punish the wrongdoer but to
protect the public,' 'proof of intention to deceive is not requisite to a finding of
violation.' "); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Foschio, 93 A.D.2d 328, 332, 462 N.Y.S.2d 44,
46-47 (2d Dept. 1983) (collecting cases).
26. Some courts have also held that deceptive intent is no longer an element of
the traditional common law offense of passing off. See, e.g., Blinded Vet. Ass'n v.
Blinded American Vet. Foundation, 872 F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (R.B.
Ginsburg, J.).
27. See Givens Practice Commentary, n.21 supra.
28. Id. at 570.
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honest businessmen."29 In any case, "one-way" attorney's fees
awards that favor plaintiffs are not necessarily inappropriate in intel-
lectual property cases. For instance, the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has taken the neutral two-way
"prevailing party" attorney fee provision of the Copyright Act of
1976 and has construed it in a nearly "one-way" manner to favor
prevailing plaintiffs.3 0 More importantly, as Judge Mukasey has
noted, the award of attorney's fees under Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and
350 is entirely discretionary, and a court may always deny the
award to a prevailing plaintiff where it is not appropriate. 1
Case law has provided little reported analysis on the question of
whether sections 349 and 350 can be applied in the trademark and
unfair competition context. Many courts have simply assumed that
these sections are applicable and have applied them without provid-
ing discussion or independent analysis.3 2 On the other hand, two
courts, again without independent analysis, have followed the Mc-
Kinney's Practice Commentary and refused to apply these
sections.
33
Two other courts have examined the scope of Gen. Bus. L. § 349
in contexts outside of the usual consumer protection model.3 4 While
neither court specifically addressed the question of whether the sec-
29. See n.13 and accompanying text supra.
30. See, e.g., Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir.
1984) (Winter, J.) ("Because Section 505 is intended in part to encourage the asser-
tion of colorable copyright claims and to deter infringement, fees are generally
awarded to prevailing plaintiffs. Fees to a prevailing defendant should not be
awarded when the plaintiff's claim is colorable since such awards would chminish
the intended incentive to bring such claims. When the plaintiff's claims are objec-
tively without arguable merit, however, a prevailing defendant may recover attor-
ney's fees.") (citations omitted).
31. Construction Technology, Inc. v. Locklormer Co., 704 F. Supp. 1212, 1223
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Beslity v. Manhattan Honda, 120 Misc. 2d 848, 467
N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. T. 1st Dept. 1983)).
32. See Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 652 F.
Supp. 1105, 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Pollack, 1.) (defendant's deliberate and know-
ing misappropriation of plaintiff's mark with the intention of erecting a barrier to
plaintiff's market penetration constituted violation of Gen. Bus. L. § 349); Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp. 735, 749 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (Sweet, J.) ("reasoning as to [trademark] infringement and dilution equally
supports granting summary judgment under [Gen. Bus. L. § 349]"), aff'd on other
grounds, 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986); Vitabiotics, Ltd. v. Krupka, 606 F. Supp.
779, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Nickerson, J.) (reverse passing-off by defendant actiona-
ble under Gen. Bus. L. § 349).
33. See Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (Stanton, J.) (quoting Givens Practice Commentary, N.21 supra); Chevy's In-
ternational, Inc. v. Sal De Enterprises, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 110, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(Nickerson, J.) ("current understanding of section 349 is that it does not apply in
trademark cases unless there is 'conduct within core areas of traditionally recog-
nized consumer deception,"' quoting Givens Practice Commentary, n.21 supra).
34. See Genesco Entertainment v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
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tion would apply in a trademark or unfair competition context, their
reasoning lends support to the conclusion that it would. In the first
case, Genesco Entertainment v. Koch, a concert promoter brought
an action against New York City, its officials and others for their fail-
ure to lease Shea Stadium to the promoter for a country and western
music concert. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a violation of Gen.
Bus. L. § 349 based upon the defendants' misrepresentations regard-
ing their intent to lease the stadium. Judge Weinfeld granted the
defendants' summary judgment on this claim for two reasons: (1) the
alleged misrepresentations did not constitute a "deceptive practice"
within the meaning of Gen. Bus. L. § 349;35 and (2) to construe the
section to apply to a breach of a private contract affecting no one
but the parties would "alter completely the legal duties governing
commercial relationships in New York."3 6 This radical alteration
would occur because section 349 does not require proof of intent to
deceive. Thus, if it was applied to this type of two-party transaction
it "would mean that the essential requirements for fraud in commer-
cial dealings would effectively be nuflified. ' 3 7 Judge Weinfeld fur-
ther stated that the "deceptive practices this statute [Gen. Bus. L.
§ 349] seeks to combat involve recurring transactions of a consumer
type" and concluded that this "'single shot transaction' involving
complex arrangements, knowledgeable and experienced parties
and large sums of money" was beyond the scope of Gen. Bus. L.
§ 349.
There was nothing in Judge Weinfeld's opinion or reasoning to
support the proposition that non-consumer businesses lacked stand-
ing to sue for violations within the scope of Gen. Bus. L. § 349.39 He
did not hold that the plaintiff lacked standing, but merely that the
injury alleged did not implicate the public interest. Moreover, while
he did not have occasion to address the issue of whether Gen. Bus.
L. § 349 would apply to deceptive practices in the trademark and
unfair competition context, such an application would fit into his
"recurring transactions of a consumer type" model. Finally, appli-
cation of sections 349 and 350 to trademark and unfair competition
offenses-unlike their application to a breach of a private con-
tract-would not alter completely the legal duties governing com-
(Weinfeld, J.); Sulner v. General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 122 Misc. 2d
597, 471 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1984) (Baer, J.).
35. Genesco Entertainment v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(Weinfeld, J.).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 752-53.
38. Id. at 752.
39. Accord Construction Technology, Inc. v. Locidormer Co., 704 F. Supp.
1212, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Muhasey, I.) ("Genesco does not stand for the broad
proposition that standing [under sections 349 and 350] should be limited to
consumers").
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mercial relationships in New York since the law that normally
applies to trademark and unfair competition offenses also does not
require an intent to deceive.
The second court to address the scope of Gen. Bus. L. § 349
outside the consumer protection context viewed the section's scope
more broadly than did Judge Weinfeld. In Sulner v. General Acc.
Fire and Life Assur. Corp.,40 the plaintiff, a forensic document ex-
aminer, suffered water damage to documents in its care. The de-
fendant insurer's claims adjuster examined the damage on a number
of visits, and allegedly told the plaintiff that it had coverage and that
it was no longer necessary to retain the damaged documents. After
the documents were disposed of, plaintiff was advised that the de-
fendant disclaimed coverage. In determining whether Gen. Bus. L.
§ 349 applied to the defendant's actions, Justice Baer did not im-
pose Judge Weinfeld's "recurring transactions of a consumer type"
requirement. In holding that the adjuster's alleged statements were
deceptive acts within the scope of Gen. Bus. L. § 349, Justice Baer
noted that "remedial statutes are liberally construed [in order] to
carry out the reforms intended."''1 This rule of construction, which
allowed relief on a one-shot transaction outside of the normal con-
sumer protection model, should, a fortiori, construe consumer de-
ception in the trademark and unfair competition context to be within
the scope of the statute.
None of the foregoing discussion is meant to suggest that reasons
could not be found for holding that deceptive practices and false
advertising in the trademark context are outside the scope of Gen.
Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350. One possible reason would be a finding of
the legislature's hostility to trademark claims as evidenced in either
the legislative histories of these provisions or other contexts.42 How-
ever, the legislative histories demonstrate no hostility to such claims.
On the contrary, as the volume of New York trademark and trade-
mark-related legislation set out in this publication illustrates, the
40. 122 Misc. 2d 597, 471 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1984) (Baer, I.).
41. Id. 122 Misc. 2d at 600, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
42. Some hostility to intellectual property protection appears to have motivated
the author of the Practice Commentary:
While trademark infringement involves an element of consumer decep-
tion, trademark and trade dress infringement cases can also involve close
judgment calls balancing risks of confusion against the risk of competition
which may be helpful to the consumer.
Givens, Practice Commentary, n.21 supra at 570 (emphasis in original).
There are two responses to this statement. One is that when there is consumer
confusion, competition is never helped nor is the consumer. The second is that
competition may be hurt if the scope of trademark protection is too broad, i.e., if
generic or functional items are protected. Trademark law itself recognizes this
problem. Proper interpretation of the provisions involved is the appropriate re-
sponse, not denying all protection.
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legislature has in a number of contexts sought to prevent the type of
conduct that leads to such infringement claims.
The existence of other parallel state and federal provisions has
been suggested as another reason for restricting the application of
sections 349 and 350 in the trademark context. However, the ex-
isting federal and state complementary statutory schemes relating
to both consumer protection and trademarks do not appear to sup-
port this argument. For example, in the consumer protection context
the scope of Gen. Bus. L. §§ 349 and 350 has not been restricted,
even though other applicable federal and New York statutes exist.
Furthermore, federal trademark and unfair competition doctrines
regularly overlap with similar state provisions. The existence of this
overlap has never been used to restrict the scope of any of these
applicable state or federal doctrines.
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APPENDIX
General Business Law Article 22-A (§§ 349 - 350-f)f
§ 349. Deceptive acts and practices unlawful
(a) Deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business,
trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state
are hereby declared unlawful.
(b) Whenever the attorney general shall believe from evidence
satisfactory to him that any person, firm, corporation or association
or agent or employee thereof has engaged in or is about to engage
in any of the acts or practices stated to be unlawful he may bring an
action in the name and on behalf of the people of the state of New
York to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitu-
tion of any moneys or property obtained directly or indirectly by
any such unlawful acts or practices. In such action preliminary re-
lief may be granted under article sixty-three of the civil practice law
and rules.
(c) Before any violation of this section is sought to be enjoined,
the attorney general shall be required to give the person against
whom such proceeding is contemplated notice by certified mail and
an opportunity to show in writing within five business days after re-
ceipt of notice why proceedings should not be instituted against
him, unless the attorney general shall find, in any case in which he
seeks preliminary relief, that to give such notice and opportunity is
not in the public interest.
(d) In any such action it shall be a complete defense that the act
or practice is, or if in interstate commerce would be, subject to and
complies with the rules and regulations of, and the statutes adminis-
tered by, the federal trade commission or any official department,
division, commission or agency of the United States as such rules,
regulations or statutes are interpreted by the federal trade commis-
sion or such department, division, commission or agency, or the fed-
eral courts.
(e) Nothing in this section shall apply to any television or radio
broadcasting station or to any publisher or printer of a newspaper,
magazine or other form of printed advertising, who broadcasts, pub-
lishes, or prints the advertisement.
(f) In connection with any proposed proceeding under this sec-
tion, the attorney general is authorized to take proof and make a
determination of the relevant facts, and to issue subpoenas in ac-
cordance with the civil practice law and rules.
(g) This section shall apply to all deceptive acts or practices de-
clared to be unlawful, whether or not subject to any other law of this
state, and shall not supersede, amend or repeal any other law of this
f Editors addition.
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state under which the attorney general is authorized to take any ac-
tion or conduct any inquiry.
(h) In addition to the right of action granted to the attorney gen-
eral pursuant to this section, any person who has been injured by
reason of any violation of this section may bring an action in his own
name to enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover
his actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both
such actions. The court may, in its discretion, increase the award of
damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages
up to one thousand dollars, if the court finds the defendant willfully
or knowingly violated this section. The court may award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
(Added L. 1970, c. 43, § 2; amended L. 1980, c. 346, § 1; L. 1984,
c. 157, § 1.)
§ 350. False advertising unlawful
(Added L. 1963, c. 813, § 1.)
§ 350-a. False advertising
1. The term "false advertising" means advertising, including la-
beling, of a commodity,or of the kind, character, terms or conditions
of any employment opportunity if such advertising is misleading in a
material respect. In determining whether any advertising is mis-
leading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not
only representations made by statement, word, design, device,
sound or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the
advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such repre-
sentations with respect to the commodity to which the advertising
relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or
under such conditions as are customary or usual. For purposes of
this article, with respect to the advertising of an employment oppor-
tunity, it shall be deemed "misleading in a material respect" to
either fail to reveal whether the employment available or being of-
fered requires or is conditioned upon the purchasing or leasing of
supplies, material, equipment or other property or whether such em-
ployment is on a commission rather than a fixed salary basis and, if
so, whether the salaries advertised are only obtainable if sufficient
commissions are earned.
2. An employer shall not be liable under this section as a result
of a failure to disclose all material facts relating to terms and condi-
tions of employment if the aggrieved person has not suffered actual
pecuniary damage as a result of the misleading advertising of an
employment opportunity or if the employer has, prior to the ag-
grieved person suffering any pecuniary damage, disclosed in writ-
ing to that person a full and accurate description of the kind,
character, terms and conditions of the employment opportunity.
(Added L. 1988, c. 615, § 1.)
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§ 350-b. Disclosures required in advertisements using the title
"doctor"
1. Any person who uses the title "doctor" in making representa-
tions for the purpose of inducing, or which are likely to induce, di-
rectly or indirectly, the purchase of (a) drugs, devises or cosmetics,
as defined in section sixty-eight hundred two of the education law,
or (b) other goods or services intended to diagnose, treat, mitigate,
prevent or cure any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, nutri-
tional deficiency or physical condition, or which are intended to ap-
pear to the purchaser of such goods or services to have done so,
shall conspicuously disclose the profession in which he or she is li-
censed, except that, where no license is required by the department
of education, such person shall conspicuously disclose the major
subject in which the degree was earned and the name of the institu-
tion that issued the degree. For the purposes of the of this section,
"conspicuously" shall mean equally in size, type or prominence and
positioned and positioned adjacent to the title "doctor". The re-
quirements of this subdivision supplement, and shall not be con-
strued to limit, the obligations of health professionals pursuant to the
education law and regulations thereunder, not shall they be con-
strued to authorize the practice of any licensed profession not the
offer of professional services by any unlicensed person.
2. In addition to any civil penalty available under section three
hundred fifty-d of this article, whenever there shall be an actual or
threatened violation of this section an application may be made to a
court or justice having jurisdiction to issue an injunction, upon no-
tice to the defendant of not less than five days, to enjoin and restrain
such actual or threatened violation; if it shall appear to the satisfac-
tion of the court or justice that the defendant is in fact assuming,
adopting or using such title or is about to assume, adopt or use such
title and that the assumption, adoption or use of such title may
deceive or mislead the public, an injunction may be issued by said
court or justice enjoining and restraining such actual or threatened
violation without requiring proof that any person has in fact been.
deceived or misled thereby.
(Added L. 1989, c. 65 § 1.)
§ 350-c. Notice of proposed action
Before the attorney-general commences an action pursuant to sec-
tion three hundred fifty-c of this article he shall be required to give
the person against whom such action is contemplated appropriate
notice by certified mail and an opportunity to show either orally or
in writing why such action should not be commenced. In such show-
ing, said person may present, among other things, that the advertise-
ment is subject to and complies with the rules and regulations of,
and the statutes administered by the Federal Trade Commission or
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any official department, division, commission or agency of the state
of New York.
(Formerly § 350-b, added L. 1963, c. 813, § 1; renumbered § 350-c
and amended L. 1989, c. 65, §§ 1, 2.)
§ 350-d. Civil penalty
Any person, firm, corporation or association or agent or employee
thereof who engages in any of the acts or practices stated in this
article to be unlawful shall be liable to a civil penalty of not more
than five hundred dollars for each violation, which shall accrue to
the state of New York and may be recovered in a civil action
brought by the attorney-general. In any such action it shall be a
complete defense that the advertisement is subject to and complies
with the rules and regulations of, and the statutes administered by
the Federal Trade Commission or any official department, division,
commission or agency of the state of New York.
(Formerly § 350-c, added L. 1963, c. 813, § 1; renumbered § 350-d,
L. 1989, c. 65, § 1.)
§ 350-e. Construction
1. This article neither enlarges nor diminishes the rights of par-
ties in private litigation except as provided in this section.
2. This article does not repeal the provisions of subdivision
twelve of section sixty-three of the executive law.
3. Any person who has been injured by reason of any violation
of section three hundred fifty or three hundred fifty-a of this article
may bring an action in his own name to enjoin such unlawful act or
practice, an action to recover his actual damages or fifty dollars,
whichever is greater, or both such actions. The court may, in its dis-
cretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed
three times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars, if the
court finds the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this sec-
tion. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff.
(Formerly § 350-d, added L. 1963, c. 813, § 1; amended L. 1980, c.
345, § 1; L. 1984, c. 157, § 2; renumbered § 350-e, L. 1989, c. 65,
§ 1.)
§ 350-f. Exceptions
Nothing in this article shall apply to any television or sound radio
broadcasting station or to any publisher or printer of a newspaper,
magazine, or other form of printed advertising, who broadcasts,
publishes, or prints such advertisement.
(Formerly § 350-e, added L. 1963, c. 813, § 1; renumbered § 350-f,
L. 1989, c. 65, § 1.)
